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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 900217-CA

TIMOTHY KEVIN DUNCAN,

Priority No. 2

Appellant/Petitioner.

INTRODUCTION
Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, Petitioner Timothy K. Duncan files this petition for
rehearing.

In Cumminas v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 P. 619 (1912),

the Utah Supreme Court noted the appropriate standard for filing a
petition:
To make an application for a rehearing is a matter of
right, and we have no desire to discourage the
practice of filing petitions for rehearings in proper
cases. When this court, however, has considered and
decided all of the material questions involved in a
case, a rehearing should not be applied for, unless we
have misconstrued or overlooked some statute or
decision which may affect the result, or that we have
based the decision on some wrong principle of law, or
have either misapplied or overlooked something which
materially affects the result . . . If there are some
reasons, however, such as we have indicated above, or
other good reasons, a petition for a rehearing should
be promptly filed and, if it is meritorious, its form
will in no case be scrutinized by this court.
129 P. at 624. This petition for rehearing meets the preceding
standards in both form and substance and should be granted for the
reasons discussed below.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On May 10, 1991, this Court affirmed Petitioner Duncan's
conviction for Receiving Stolen Property, a second degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408, -412(1)(a)(i), and Theft by
Deception, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-405.

The Court of Appeals7 decision is attached as

Addendum A.

Mr. Duncan received one 14 day extension for filing

this petition.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
No factual statements are necessary; this petition
addresses only a question of law.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This Court found that since Michael Skillings, a State
witness, was convicted of a misdemeanor offense, his past crime
could not be used against him for impeachment purposes under Rule
609(a)(1).

In contrast to the Court's opinion, however, case law

only supports its ruling when a witness for the defendant
testifies.

A rehearing is necessary to determine whether the

protections of Rule 609(a)(1) even apply to nondefendant witnesses.
Whenever a State witness testifies, his felony and misdemeanor
convictions may both be used to attack his credibility.

- 2

ARGUMENT
POINT
THE IMPEACHMENT PROVISION OF RULE 609(a)(1) DOES NOT
APPLY TO NONDEFENDANT WITNESSES
For this petition, Petitioner Duncan does not dispute
further the Court's ruling on whether a guilty plea constitutes a
conviction for impeachment purposes.

Petitioner questions only

whether the impeachment provisions of Rule 609(a)(1) even apply to
nondefendant witnesses.
609(a)(1).

See Utah R. Evid. 609(a)(1); Fed. R. Evid.

If Rule 609(a)(1) does not apply to State witnesses like

Michael Skillings, Skillings' credibility should have been impeached
with evidence of his prior conviction regardless of whether it was
classified as a felony or a misdemeanor.
In footnote four of its opinion, this Court wrote, inter
alia;
Because Skillings' conviction was not punishable by
more than one year incarceration, the requirement of
Rule 609(a)(1) to balance the prejudicial and
probative aspects of evidence of the conviction does
not apply. Therefore, we do not address appellant's
arguments about the applicability of that requirement
where the impeached witness is not the defendant.
State v. Duncan, Case No. 900217-CA, page 8 n. 4 (Utah App. May 10,
1991).

Ordinarily, when defense witnesses are involved, the Court's

statements hold true. Misdemeanor convictions could not be used for
impeachment purposes under Rule 609(a)(1).
When a nondefendant witness testifies, however, not only is
the balancing test then inapplicable the rule itself provides no
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basis for excluding any conviction of a State witness.

In harmony

with this principle is a recent decision by the United States
Supreme Court. 1

See Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504

(1989).
In Green. the Court found "that the rule [609(a)(1)] was
meant to authorize the judge to weigh prejudice against no one other
than a criminal defendant."

490 U.S. at 521.

A civil witness could

therefore be impeached with evidence of his prior felony conviction
because "only the accused in a criminal case should be protected
from unfair prejudice by the balance set out in Rule 609(a)(1)."
Id. at 524.

The Court rendered its decision after examining the

language in the rule and its legislative history.
"The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees a
criminal defendant certain fair trial rights not enjoyed by the
prosecution . . . ."

Id. at 511.

"[I]mpeaching evidence

detrimental to the prosecution in a criminal case 'shall be

1

Other well-established authorities similarly recognize
the right and importance of cross-examination, particularly by using
prior convictions for impeachment purposes. See, e.g., State v.
McCumber, 622 P.2d 353, 358 (Utah 1980); see also State v. Leonard,
707 P.2d 650, 655-56 (Utah 1985) (citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S.
400, 405 (1965) ("There are few subjects, perhaps, upon which [the
Supreme Court] and other courts have been more nearly unanimous than
in their expressions of belief that the right of confrontation and
cross-examination is an essential and fundamental requirement for
the kind of fair trial which is this country's constitutional
goal"); U.S. Const, amend. VI; Utah Const, art. 1, § 12; Utah Code
Ann. § 78-24-1, State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1333-33 (Utah 1986)
(construing Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-9); Utah R. Evid. 404(a)(3); Utah
R. Evid. 607; Utah R. Evid. 608(a)(1); cf. Utah R. Civ. P. 43(a).
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admitted7 without any such balancing."

Id. at 509.

"It was the

judgment of the [legislative] Conference that the danger of
prejudice to a nondefendant witness is outweighed by the need for
the trier of fact to have as much relevant evidence on the issue of
credibility as possible."
93-1597, pp. 9-10 (1974)).

Id. at 520 (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No.
"Equally clear is the conferee's

intention that the rule shield the accused, but not the prosecution,
in a criminal case."

490 U.S. at 520.

"Any prejudice [that]

convictions [used for] impeachment [purposes] might cause witnesses
other than the accused was deemed 'so minimal as scarcely to be a
subject of comment.'"

Id. at 522 (citations omitted).

Just as the Green Court2 could not afford nondefendant
witnesses the protections of Rule 609's balancing test, Petitioner
Duncan respectfully requests this Court to find inapplicable the
rule's impeachment provisions for Michael Skillings' misdemeanor
conviction.

If both felony and misdemeanor convictions of a State

witness are automatically admissible for impeachment purposes, the
Duncan decision is premised incorrectly on the assumption that Rule
609(a)(1) even applies. Petitioner therefore requests a rehearing
to determine whether the trial court erred in using Rule 609(a)(1)
as a basis for excluding Skillings' misdemeanor conviction.

2

In State v. Smith, Case No. 900214-CA, Point I (Utah
App. Appellee's opening brief filed May 20, 1991), the State also
conceded the inapplicability of Rule 609 for a nondefendant witness.
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CONCLUSION
Timothy Duncan requests a rehearing by this Court to
determine whether Rule 609(a)(1) applies to the convictions of a
State witness, regardless of how the conviction was ultimately
classified.
SUBMITTED this

T

day of June, 1991.

s:
RONALD S. FUJINO
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner
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State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

OPINION
(For Publication)
Case No. 900217-CA

v.
Timothy Kevin Duncan,
Defendant and Appellant.

F I L E D
(May 10, 1991)

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup
Attorneys:

Charles F. Loyd, Jr. and Ronald S. Fujino, Salt
Lake City, for Appellant
R. Paul Van Dam and David B. Thompson, Salt Lake
City, for Appellee

Before Judges Greenwood, Jackson, and Russon.
GREENWOOD, Judge:
Appellant, Timothy Kevin Duncan, appeals his jury
conviction of theft by deception, a class B misdemeanor, under
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (1990), and receiving stolen
property, a second degree felony, under Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-408 and § 76-6-4 12(1)(a)(i) (1989). Duncan asserts that
the trial court erred in prohibiting impeachment of a
prosecution witness with a prior criminal conviction, We
affirm Duncan's conviction.
BACKGROUND
On July 8, 1989, a used plasma cutter and a used battery
charger were stolen from "Mike's Auto Body" shop in Salt Lake
City, Utah. Both items were pawned in Salt Lake City.
Duncan's signature appeared on the pawn receipt. On August 29,
1989, Duncan was charged with receiving stolen property, a

second degree felony, and with theft by deception, a class B
misdemeanor. Prior to trial, Duncan sought a ruling from the
trial court to allow him to impeach the prosecution's chief
witness, Mike Skillings. Shillings was the owner of Mike's
Auto Body.
Skillings had been charged in 1986 with unlawful
distribution for value of a controlled substance, a second
degree felony. He had pleaded guilty to a lesser charge of
attempted unlawful distribution of a controlled substance, a
third degree felony. The trial court then entered a conviction
for Skillings1 offense as a class A misdemeanor pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (1990). This statute provides that
(1) If the court, having regard to the
nature and circumstances of the offense
of which the defendant was found guilty
and to the history and character of the
defendant, concludes that it would be
unduly harsh to record the conviction as
being for that category of offense
established by statute and to sentence
the defendant to an alternative normally
applicable to that offense, the court
may, unless otherwise specifically
provided by law, enter a judgment of
conviction for that next lower category
of offense and impose sentence
accordingly.
(2) Whenever a conviction is for a
felony, the conviction shall be deemed
to be a misdemeanor if:
(a) The judge designates that
sentence to be for a misdemeanor and the
sentence imposed is within the limits
provided by law for a misdemeanor . . . .
As a result, Skillings' offense was denoted as attempted
unlawful distribution for value of a controlled substance, a
class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced to twelve months in jail
with eighteen months probation.
Duncan moved for permission to use Skillings' guilty plea
to impeach his testimony pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 609(a),
Rule 609(a) provides as follows:

900217-CA
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For the purpose of attacking the
credibility of a witness, evidence that
he has been convicted of a crime shall
be admitted if elicited from him or
established by public record during
cross-examination but only if the crime
(1) was punishable by death or
imprisonment in excess of one year under
the law under which he was convicted,
and the court determines that the
probative value of admitting this
evidence outweighs its prejudicial
effect to the defendant, or (2) involved
dishonesty or false statement,
regardless of the punishment.
The trial court denied Duncan's pretrial motion to impeach
Skillings' testimony with his 1986 conviction, concluding that
the conviction could not be used for impeachment purposes under
Rule 609(a)(1) because it was a misdemeanor not punishable by
imprisonment in excess of one year and did not involve a crime
of dishonesty or false statement. It stated:
The court concludes that the order of
May 2nd, 1986, signed by Judge Sawaya is
the actual conviction. That on its face
indicates that the crime is attempted
unlawful distribution for value of a
controlled substance, a class A
misdemeanor.
Accordingly, under 609(a), the court
concludes that it is not a conviction
involving imprisonment for over one
year. So, for that reason, I will not
allow you to use that for impeachment
purposes.
Subsequently, Skillings was allowed to testify as to the
fair market value of the used battery charger and used plasma
cutter that were stolen from his auto repair shop.
After a
jury trial, Duncan was convicted as charged. He was sentenced
1. Skillings testified that the stolen property's value
exceeded $1,000, thus constituting a second degree felony under
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1)(a)(i) rather than a lesser crime
under subsections (b), (c), or (d), if the property were valued
at less than $1,000.
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to concurrent terms of one to fifteen years for the felony and
six months for the misdemeanor.
On appeal, Duncan argues the trial court erred in
excluding evidence about the prior criminal conviction of
State's witness Skillings.
ANALYSIS
We must determine whether a plea of guilty to a felony
should be considered a felony conviction for impeachment
purposes under Rule 609(a)(1) when a judgment of conviction was
subsequently entered for a misdemeanor pursuant to a statute
that allows a judge to enter a judgment of conviction for the
next lower category of offense.
Duncan argues that by excluding evidence of Skillings'
prior conviction, the court deprived him of an effective means
of impeaching Skillings* credibility. He contends that when
Skillings pleaded guilty to a third degree felony charge, his
plea constituted the "conviction" for impeachment purposes.
Further, he claims that a subsequent reduction of the crime
should not nullify the operation of his guilty plea as a
conviction for impeachment purposes. We disagree.
When a challenge to a trial court's decision concerns a
question of law, we accord no particular deference, but review
for correctness. Scharf v. BMG Corp.. 700 P.2d 1068, 1070
(Utah 1985). Statutory interpretation presents a question of
law. Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1038 (Utah
1989); State v. Seroente, 768 P.2d 994, 995 (Utah Ct. App.
1989) .
We begin by determining the applicable definition of
"conviction" under Rule 609(a), noting that courts have
utilized differing interpretations. At common law, the court
had to enter a judgment on the finding of guilt before a person
was "convicted" of a crime. Myers v. State, 303 Md. 639, 496
A.2d 312, 313 (1985) (citing 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials
at Common Law § 521, at 731 (J. Chadbourn ed. 1979). In recent
cases, the definition turns upon the context and the purpose
within which the term "conviction" is used. _LcL at 313; see
also Conlow v. State, 441 A.2d 638, 639 (Del. 1982) (per
curiam); State v. Eoe, 274 N.W. 2d 350, 355 (Iowa 1979). For
example, an ordinary or popular usage refers to guilt by
verdict or plea before, and independent of, the judgment of the
court. Myers, 496 A.2d at 313; State v. Hanna, 179 N.W. 2d
503, 508 (Iowa 1970) .
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On the other hand, when applying a legal and technical
meaning, "conviction" refers to the final judgment entered on
the plea or verdict of guilty. Vasouez v. Courtney, 537 P.2d
536, 537 (Oregon 1975) ("The second, more technical meaning of
conviction refers to the final judgment entered on a plea or
verdict of guilty. In the latter case conviction has not been
accomplished until the judgment is made by the court"); Mvers,
496 A.2d at 315 ("[A] person is not 'convicted1 of an offense
until the court enters a judgment upon the verdict of guilty").
Duncan, citing State v. Delsshmutt, 676 P.2d 383 (Utah
1983) (per curiam), contends that the relevant reference point
for impeachment purposes is the guilty plea and not the
judgment of conviction. In Delashmutt, the defendant appealed
his felony convictions on grounds that the trial court erred in
denying his motion to suppress evidence of a prior guilty plea
to a felony in Washington where sentence had not been imposed.
The court held that "a prior plea of guilty to a felony is a
conviction that must be answered by an accused . . . . " I£. at
384.
Subsequent to Delashmutt, however, doubts have surfaced as
to its continued viability.~ In State v. Theison, 709 P.2d 307
(Utah 1985) (per curiam), the supreme court upheld denial of
the defendant's petition for expungement of his conviction
because of an inadequate record on appeal. The supreme court
found that the entry of a guilty plea alone did not constitute
a conviction to justify possible expungement.
Our examination of the record fails
to disclose any conviction of defendant
to be expunged. . . . There is nothing
in the record before this Court to show
any acceptance of the guilty plea,
findings, conviction, judgment, or
imposition of sentence by the lower
court upon defendant.
2. In State v. Morrell, 149 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Ct. App. 1990),
this court stated that "Delashmutt has questionable value as
precedent. Significant case law concerning the nature of
guilty pleas has developed since Delashmutt which gives doubt
to its continued vitality." 13. at 30 n.2, (citing State v.
Galleqos, 738 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1987)); State v. Kav, 717 P.2d
1294, 1303-05 (Utah 1986). Morrell also observed that "[i]n
view of the liberality with which motions to withdraw guilty
pleas are to be granted prior to sentence . . . we see real
difficulty, for Rule 609(a)(2) purposes, in equating a mere
guilty plea, prior to sentencing, with an actual conviction."

Hi.
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Without any indication in the
record of the proceedings below
concerning the disposition of the second
degree felony charge against defendant,
we cannot determine in what manner the
court acted. It is possible that the
court intended to enter defendant's
conviction, impose sentence which was
stayed, and place defendant on
probation. But the record does not so
indicate.
Id. at 308 (footnote omitted).
Theison recognizes that guilty pleas can be modified or
even nullified by subsequent events. Equating a guilty plea
with a conviction is therefore a questionable practice.
Further dilution of Delashmutt is found in State v.
g_alleqos, 738 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1987), where the defendant
appealed from a denial of his presentence motion to withdraw
his plea of guilty to aggravated sexual assault. The supreme
court held that, entry of a plea of guilty involves waiver of
important constitutional rights, a presentence motion to
withdraw a guilty plea should be liberally granted. Id. at
1041-42. Likewise, in State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294, 1299 (Utah
1986), the supreme court emphasized the non-finality of guilty
pleas prior to sentencing. Therefore, we read Utah cases to
mean that when the crime encompassed in a guilty plea is later
modified by withdrawal of the plea or the court's judgment, the
later action defines the actual conviction.
We also look to interpretations of the Federal Rules of
Evidence for guidance. See State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325,
1334 (Utah 1986). Federal cases that discuss guilty pleas for
purposes of impeachment under Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(1) are
scarce, but suggest that a guilty plea to a crime not involving
dishonesty or false statement can be used to impeach a witness
only where it has resulted in conviction at a felony level.
See United States v. Pardo, 636 F.2d 535, 545 n.32 (D.C. Cir.
1980) .
However, prior to the 1975 adoption of the present federal
rules, the "settled view" was that a guilty plea upon which
conviction had not been entered could not be used to impeach a
witness. United States v. Semensohn, 421 F.2d 1206, 1208 (2nd
Cir. 1970); Crawford v. United States, 41 F.2d 979, 980 (D.C.
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Cir. 1930) (also citing five state cases). See also United
States v. Lee, 509 F.2d 400, 405 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (applying
District of Columbia code provision identical to Rule 609(a)).
The contrary view was espoused in United States v. Turner, 497
F.2d 406, 408 (10th Cir. 1974), and appellant urges us to adopt
that view here. Turner, however, does not appear to be widely
followed, if at all. Therefore, given its minority status,
along with the non-final nature of a guilty plea, as evidenced
in recent Utah decisions, we decline to adopt the Turner
approach of equating a guilty plea with a conviction for Rule
609(a)(1) impeachment purposes.
We finally revisit the text of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402
(1990), under which witness Skillings' conviction was reduced
to a class A misdemeanor. Subsection (2)(a) states that a
felony upon which a misdemeanor sentence is imposed shall be
deemed to be a misdemeanor conviction. In interpreting
statutes, we "give effect, if possible, to every word of the
statute." Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 252 n.ll (Utah
1988); £££ also Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-11 (1990) (words in
statutes generally construed by context and approved usage).
Duncan's argument would require us, in effect, to construe
section 76-3-402 to mean that a felony sentenced as a
misdemeanor shall be deemed a misdemeanor except when the
offense is needed to impeach the defendant under Rule
609(a)(1). The language of section 76-3-402 simply does not
support this exception. Instead, the language indicates that a
guilty defendant who is considered worthy of a reduced sentence
should receive all the advantages that go with such leniency.
Those advantages include the privilege not to have certain
transgressions used later to impeach credibility.
In view of the foregoing, we hold that it is the final
judgment of the court on a guilty verdict or plea that
constitutes a conviction for impeachment purposes under Rule
609(a)(1). It is this "conviction" which reflects the final
determination of the seriousness of the acts committed and, as
a result, its relevance for impeachment purposes. Therefore,
Skillings' guilty plea to a felony is not controlling, but
3. Section 68-3-11 also states that "technical words and
phrases, and such others as have acquired a peculiar and
appropriate meaning in law . . . are to be construed according
to such peculiar and appropriate meaning or definition." As
already discussed, we have adopted the "technical" meaning of
the word "conviction" for Rule 609(a)(1) purposes.
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rather the subsequent judgment of conviction of a misdemeanor
controls. Since the conviction was not for a felony punishable
by more than a year incarceration, and is not asserted to be
for a crime involving dishonesty or false statement, it could
not be used to impeach Skillings.4
CONCLUSION
The trial court properly excluded the use of witness
Skillings' misdemeanor conviction for impeachment purposes
under Rule 609(a)(1). Accordingly, appellant Duncan's
conviction in the instant case is affirmed.

.^^^i

7~ *gL

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

WE CONCUR:

f?52Z^4z^^
Norman H. Jackson,^Judge

Leonard H. Russon, Judge

4. See State v. Morehouse, 748 P.2d 217, 222 n.2 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988) (possession of controlled substance is crime not
involving dishonesty or false statement). See also State v.
Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 653-56 (Utah 1989) (discussing
"credibility-deteriorating quality" of crime admissible under
Rule 609(a)(2)) .
Because Skillings' conviction was not punishable by more
than one year incarceration, the requirement of Rule 609(a)(1)
to balance the prejudicial and probative aspects of evidence of
the conviction does not apply. Therefore, we do not address
appellant's arguments about the applicability of that
requirement where the impeached witness is not the defendant.
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